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The Youth Bulge in Egypt: An 
Intersection of Demographics, 
Security, and the Arab Spring
Dan LaGraffe
Department of Defense1
Introduction
From continent to continent and across race and religion, the "demo-
graphic" of insurgency, ethnic conflict, terrorism, and state-sponsored 
violence holds constant. The vast majority of recruits are young men, 
most of them out of school and out of work. It is a formula that hardly 
varies, whether in the scattered hideouts of Al Qaeda, on the backstreets 
of Baghdad or Port-au-Prince, or in the rugged mountains of Mace-
donia, Chechnya, Afghanistan, or eastern Colombia.
—Richard Cincotta2
Weeks of high-profile protests in downtown Cairo resulted in the ousting 
of former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. Academics and policymak-
ers put forth theories on the causes of this phenomenon that quickly 
swept across the Middle East. Did the blame lie with authoritarian 
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regimes under which oppressed people had simply had enough? Was it 
sparked by the increasing price of wheat?3 While the ultimate cause of the 
unrest that led to Mubarak's demise is likely a combination of many fac-
tors, one thing is certain—the demographics of Egypt and throughout the 
region have played an important role in the widespread instability. With 
this in mind, communities, countries, regional organizations, and the 
international community must enact, monitor, and assess policies that 
provide youth with "decent work" and social engagement in order to avert 
future crises.
This article aims to provide a better understanding of the intersection of 
demographics and security in the contemporary context by identifying 
and clarifying the existing arguments in the literature. It then examines a 
case study of Egypt, one of the countries at the center of the "Arab 
Spring," and the most relevant among these countries to Middle East 
security and strategic stability in the overall region. This paper argues that 
the youth bulge in Egypt played a major role in the political transition and 
as such serves as the prime example of the intersection of demographics, 
security, and the Arab Spring.
Parameters
This article examines the relationship between demographic factors and 
security in the context of the Arab Spring. In essence, it analyzes how 
demographic factors interact with causes of insecurity and what can be 
done to mitigate their negative effects. It does so by first discussing the 
extent to which demographic factors can affect security. The article con-
siders a number of conditions, such as unemployment and poverty, as 
intervening variables between demography and security. Demographics 
can exacerbate conditions such as unemployment or poverty, resulting in 
a range of different security issues.
The majority of the relevant literature defines "youth" as being between 
ages fifteen and twenty-four and this article uses the same definition. Fur-
thermore, this article contends that traditional perceptions of unemploy-
ment—defined as people lacking any sort of employment—as a cause of 
insecurity can be misleading in much of the developing world. Unemploy-
ment alone does not paint a complete picture of the social and demo-
graphic situation in a country. Thus, the definition of an unemployed 
person used throughout the article will include people in a number of 
other situations, such as those who are underemployed, the working poor, 
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people no longer looking for work, and the disenfranchised—all critical 
segments of the population when examining the relationship between 
demographics and security.
Literature Review
A number of root causes of conflict and instability are identified in inter-
national security literature. These include, but are not limited to, unem-
ployment, poverty, social unrest, urbanization, and declining economic 
conditions. Demographics interact with these often preexisting conditions 
and aggravate them, acting as a "force multiplier" for the drivers of con-
flict. In this way, demographics serve as an intervening variable. Unem-
ployment and poverty exist in society regardless of a country's 
demographic structure; however, the negative effects of the aforemen-
tioned variables on security are more dramatic in cases where a demo-
graphic challenge is present.
Unemployment
The youth bulge is a demographic phenomenon strongly connected to 
security challenges. As stated above, youth bulges are defined as large 
cohorts between the ages of fifteen and twenty-four, expressed as a per-
centage of the total population.4 In many countries a youth bulge can 
result in a shortage of jobs. As population growth exceeds economic 
growth, the problem becomes more acute. At present, "[h]alf of the 
world's population is under the age of 24 years, with currently 1.2 billion 
young people (15–24 years) participating as the largest cohort ever enter-
ing the transition to adult status, which usually includes the desire for 
meaningful employment opportunities."5 Sadly, these opportunities are 
grossly lacking; as a percentage of total global unemployment, youth 
account for 40 percent, yet their share of the working-age population is 
only 25 percent.
Compared to adults, youth are approximately three times as likely to be 
unemployed.6 This trend is likely to continue, if not worsen, given the 
demographic challenges facing the planet. Developing countries are also 
home to nine out of ten children who are under the age of fifteen, and 
maintain the world's highest birthrates.7 Furthermore, it is estimated 
that:
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"Over 70 percent of the world's population growth between now 
and 2050 will occur in 24 countries, all of which are classified by 
the World Bank as low income or lower-middle income, with an 
average per capita income of under $3,855 in 2008."8
The intersection of these phenomena may aggravate the various causes of 
poverty, increasing the likelihood of civil conflict. Experts across the field 
suggest that it may be necessary to monitor the variables that contribute 
to high birth rates, such as the level of female education, to curtail this 
trend in the future.9
Poverty
Youth bulges, and the ensuing unemployment, result in an increased per-
centage of people living in poverty. Young people make up almost 60 per-
cent of the poor in the world.10 One of the seminal works on this topic 
finds that an increase of 1 percent in youth population within a country 
results in a 4 percent increase in the likelihood of conflict.11 Furthermore,
"When youth make up more than 35 percent of the adult popula-
tion, which is evident in many developing countries, the risk of 
armed conflict is 150 percent higher than in countries with an age 
structure similar to most developed countries."12
Poverty contributes to nearly all the security shortcomings discussed in 
this paper.13, 14 In fact, experts argue that it may play an even more prom-
inent role relative to other contributors of instability. Development econ-
omist Paul Collier presents evidence that weak economic growth and low 
income contribute to instability far more than any ethnic disputes. 
Indeed, Collier finds ethnic diversity is inversely related to insecurity.15
Social Unrest
Youth unemployment in extremis causes feelings of alienation from soci-
ety and political processes, giving rise to social unrest.16 Dr. Henrik Urdal 
of the Peace Research Institute of Oslo asserts that "generally it has been 
observed that young males are the main protagonists of criminal as well 
as political violence."17 Worldwide, young men are responsible for three 
quarters of violent crimes.18 Criminal activity is an area in which both 
greed and grievance explanations are valid. Collier and Urdal agree that a 
large youth population lowers the recruitment cost for potential rebel and 
criminal gang leaders as such ventures become more enticing to the 
unemployed. Similarly, a large population of college-educated young men 
who have high expectations are more likely to become radicalized. Fareed 
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Zakaria points out that in most Arab countries more than half of the pop-
ulation is less than twenty-five years of age. Using historical precedent, he 
argues, "France went through a youth bulge just before the French revolu-
tion, as did Iran before its 1979 revolution. In the Arab world, this revolu-
tion has taken the form of an Islamic resurgence."19 Simply put, large, 
unemployed, poor youth populations have a negative effect on security 
and are more likely to be involved in criminal activity, aggravating social 
unrest. Further, there is less of an opportunity cost for these youthful pop-
ulations to be involved in prolonged protest activities.
Not only does the mere presence of a youth bulge matter to security, but a 
number of other demographic metrics are relevant as well. The size of the 
specific youth bulge cohort plays a role. According to Easterlin's relative 
cohort size theory, "other things constant, the economic and social for-
tunes of a cohort (those born in a given year) tend to vary inversely with 
its relative size."20 Essentially, Easterlin argues, larger cohorts within a 
youth bulge will suffer more difficult conditions as increased competition 
and "crowding mechanisms" affect different aspects of social life, such as 
school or the labor market. Large youth cohorts that are unable to find 
decent work will often move into the illegal and illicit economy.
Declining Economic Conditions
Additionally, there are a number of economic arguments relating to 
demographics and security. Dr. Jack Goldstone of George Mason Univer-
sity argues that "twenty-first century international security will depend 
less on how many people inhabit the world than on how the global popu-
lation is composed and distributed."21 The most striking example of this 
trend is found in smaller developing countries, located throughout the 
Middle East and Africa, that average between 2.5 and 4.7 percent growth. 
With the United States, Europe and other Western countries growing at a 
much slower pace, and even shrinking in some cases, the relative demo-
graphic weight of the West is in decline. It is projected that "the relative 
demographic weight of the world's developed countries will drop by 
nearly 25 percent" in the next forty years.22
Although this may have classic balance-of-power implications for the 
realist, most experts in this school of thought are concerned with eco-
nomic power. As populations decline, either absolutely or relatively, their 
economic clout in the form of percentage of global gross domestic product 
(GDP) declines as well. As Dr. Goldstone reiterates, "The proportion of 
global GDP produced by Europe, the United States, and Canada fell from 
68 percent in 1950 to 47 percent in 2003 and will decline even more 
steeply in the future."23
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Defense and national security policy is, on some level, a function of the 
economic strength of a state. This being the case Dr. Goldstone, in a 
report from the Environmental Change and Security Program at the Woo-
drow Wilson International Center for Scholars, asserts:
"The military capacities of large developing countries will 
increase, while the ability of rich nations to put 'boots on the 
ground' in conflict zones will diminish. Managing conflicts 
involving developing countries will become more difficult, and 
will put more of a strain on developed countries' economies, than 
before."24
The particular stage along the demographic transition in which that coun-
try is situated is another important demographic metric. A country in one 
of the earlier stages of development will consistently have very high birth 
and death rates. High birth rates over time will cause large cohorts of 
youth to follow one after the other, thereby creating, or increasing the size 
of, a youth bulge in the population. This, in turn, increases the depen-
dency ratio, or the ratio of non-workers to workers within a population. A 
higher dependency ratio is representative of the portion of the population 
not earning income, participating in the tax base, or creating economic 
growth. There is further concern that within this non-working population, 
more require social services, are unable to contribute to the family unit, 
and thereby drag down household income levels.
Further exacerbating the economic problem is the "graying" of popula-
tions in the West. Not only will the growth of Western populations be out-
paced by the growth of developing nations, but Western countries will 
grow older. The working population in Western countries will shrink, 
decreasing overall productivity, and the elderly, retired populations will 
increase. This increases the dependency ratio as discussed above, albeit 
on the other end of the age spectrum.
Urbanization
In academic and policy circles alike, the threat of failed states is at the top 
of the agenda. Just as important for security, however, is the threat of 
failed cities.25 With the general shift from agricultural jobs toward those 
in the manufacturing and service industries, youth, as well as populations 
in general, are moving from rural to urban areas at an alarming rate. A 
National Intelligence Council study, Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue 
About the Future with Nongovernment Experts, supplemented with data 
gathered by research centers including the United Nations Population 
Division, estimates that the world population will total 7.2 billion by 2015. 
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This represents approximately an 18 percent increase over the past fifteen 
years. Furthermore, the study concludes that "ninety-five percent of the 
growth will take place in 'emerging' countries, and nearly all projected 
population growth will occur in rapidly expanding urban areas."26
Overcrowding in urban centers not only causes but exacerbates problems 
and inequalities within society as municipalities outgrow their governing 
capacities. Naval War College professors P.H. Liotta and James F. Miskel 
claim, "many of the burgeoning cities of the future may well become Petri 
dishes of instability, disease, and terrorism."27 Furthermore, in a global-
ized world it is easier for individuals or groups to export this instability 
with regional and international security implications. Richard Cincotta of 
Population Action International also argues that these two demographic 
factors, urbanization and youth bulges, are interrelated. He believes that 
"urban areas—particularly those in Asia—are increasingly the principal 
locus of ethnic and religious conflict."28
Youth Bulges and Interstate Conflict
Although intrastate conflict is usually the prominent concern arising from 
youth bulges, they may also inadvertently place countries at a higher risk 
of interstate conflict. The case study in this article exemplifies intrastate 
conflict. It is necessary, however, to understand all aspects of the youth 
bulge's role in conflict and how the youth bulge may play a role, in gen-
eral, in shaping the post-revolution Middle East.
First, many developing countries are tempted to enlist large numbers of 
youth to keep unemployment at an acceptable level and to imbue the 
youth with a sense of nationalist pride. This, however, has the unintended 
effect of altering the regional military balance, possibly leading to regional 
instability.29 Historians further argue that youth bulges enabled countries 
in early modern and modern Europe to "wrest territory from their conti-
nental neighbors and build overseas empires."30 Additionally, increasing 
competition for resources within the region can be a further point of con-
tention between states.
Case Study: Egypt
The recent upheavals in the Middle East, most notably the Egyptian Revo-
lution, bring demographic factors to the fore. The primary drivers that led 
to instability and eventually the Egyptian revolt may be debated, but 
demographics undeniably played a prominent role.
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Any discussion of these events must first put the demography of Egypt 
into context. The population of Middle Eastern countries has more than 
quadrupled over the past sixty years. According to the United Nations 
Population Division, in 1950 the combined population of all Middle East-
ern countries was 60.2 million, compared with the more than 271 million 
in 2005. Its percentage of the total world population has doubled from 2.5 
to 5 percent over that same time period.31 Even more stunning are the fig-
ures for Egypt itself: it has grown over 378 percent from 1950 to the 
present, beginning at 21.5 million inhabitants and standing currently at 
over 81 million.32
Put another way, the population of Egypt today has 20 million more peo-
ple than the entire Middle East did in 1950. On a municipal level, Cairo is 
the most populous metropolitan area on the African continent, and one of 
the most densely populated cities in the world. The reason Tahrir Square 
functioned as the heartbeat of the revolution was, in part, because many 
of the demographic stress factors were exacerbated in the overcrowded 
Cairo metropolitan area. Furthermore, the population is projected to 
grow by approximately 50 percent over the next half century.
As discussed above, it is not only the total size of the population, but its 
make-up, that can cause societal demographic stress. The Middle East is 
endowed with one of the youngest populations in the world; the popula-
tion under the age of fifteen is over 33 percent. Most individual nations in 
the region have youth cohorts under the age of twenty-four that account 
for over half of their population. Egypt is no different, with over 54 per-
cent of its population making up the under-twenty-four demographic. 
Adding to the demographic warning signs are the 24 million Egyptians 
who are between the ages of fifteen and twenty-nine, also referred to in 
the demographic security field as "fighting age."33
The Middle East claims one of the highest unemployment rates in the 
world. Additionally, the level of social capacity required to fulfill the needs 
of new generations is sorely lacking. Youth populations experiencing a 
combination of economic hardship, too few political venues for voicing 
grievances, and an inundation of a revolutionary ideology are more likely 
to cause political instability.34 As of 2010 the Egyptian unemployment 
rate was reportedly 9.7 percent, although this does not include the 
underemployed.35
The result of the aforementioned demographic dynamics is now history. 
Hosni Mubarak resigned under great pressure brought on by the protests 
and demonstrations of millions in Tahrir Square that brought Egypt's 
economy to a halt. These demonstrations, which lasted for weeks, were 
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due to a ripe population; one that was young, unemployed or underem-
ployed, and disaffected, which made them much easier to mobilize. While 
overall unemployment rates were not particularly alarming, there was a 
concentration of unemployment among college-educated youth. Egypt 
has a median age of twenty-four and a government that provides free 
higher education. About 25 percent of Egypt's population is college edu-
cated. Close to 87 percent of the unemployed in Egypt are between the 
ages of fifteen and twenty-nine, with unemployment among Egyptian col-
lege graduates being ten times higher than those who did not go to col-
lege.36 The International Organization for Migration recently completed a 
study confirming these conditions. It found that the most significant push 
factor for young Egyptians who wish to migrate is a lack of employment 
opportunities. Furthermore, employment troubles were exacerbated by 
events during the Egyptian revolution.37
Some argue that the recent increase in the cost of wheat in Egypt was a 
contributing factor. While this is true, it is important to understand that it 
was an increase in the costs for food and fuel, in conjunction with demo-
graphic challenges, that ignited the situation. As discussed earlier, Egypt's 
demographic situation acted as a force multiplier for some already desta-
bilizing conditions. A brief released by the United States Institute of Peace 
aptly describes the situation:
"Egyptians saw their real incomes severely eroded in the face of 
uncontrollable price hikes of basic necessities. The recent global 
recession made things much worse for many Egyptians, and the 
population living in poverty rose precipitously. These factors 
combined to help push Egypt's restless population over the tip-
ping point—many felt that they had little more to lose…[i]n the 
end, Egypt's youth were buffeted by the 'perfect storm.' Unfair 
parliamentary elections and the wave of political unrest in Tuni-
sia may have lit the fuse but underlying socioeconomic inequities 
fuelled continued unrest."38
Interestingly, the same segment of the population that is considered to be 
the youth bulge has a mastery of technology unparalleled by any genera-
tion that has come before it. The use of social media to organize the youth 
was paramount in bringing about regime change in Egypt, and in protests 
across the Middle East writ large. Without the widespread use of social 
media, for example, knowledge and outrage over the self-immolation of 
the twenty-six-year-old man in Tunisia who was unable to support his 
family may have been less widespread. Without the use of social media in 
Egypt in particular, the scale of protests might have been curbed by the 
blackout of state-controlled media. These factors, along with the others 
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mentioned throughout this article, demonstrate how demographics in 
general, and the youth bulge in particular, affected regime change in 
Egypt.
Implications—Turning the "New Population Bomb" 
into the "Demographic Dividend"
The literature review and case study presented in this article highlight a 
number of policy implications and recommendations for governments in 
the Middle East. Demographic trends in general and youth bulges in par-
ticular can have enormous impact on state security and ultimately regime 
stability, as witnessed in the Middle East during the Arab Spring.
Many responses to demographic challenges, whether from governments 
or international organizations, focus on the training and education of the 
young unemployed. This trend is due to the risks created by leaving these 
groups idle. Solutions must be tailored to the specific problems of the 
youth demographic. For instance, the new Egyptian government could 
adopt the idea of economists Raymond Gilpin, Amal Kandeel, and Paul 
Sullivan of the United States Institute of Peace, who state that Egypt 
should "introduce initiatives that would help align Egypt's education and 
training institutions with the realities and requirements of a vibrant econ-
omy. This would make the workforce more prepared for the job market 
and encourage much-needed investment."39 By doing this, the education 
system could ensure that the jobs it is preparing its graduates for coincide 
with the market demand for labor. In turn, better cooperation between 
government and private industry is in order. The private sector must do a 
better job of informing the government about available jobs, as well as 
what skill sets are in high demand.
Knowing where to focus youth programs is paramount. It is also impor-
tant for policymakers and practitioners formulating and developing policy 
in or for the Middle East to be mindful of the unemployment "multiplier 
effects" on instability that are associated with youth bulges. Policymakers 
must not neglect to consider the underemployed and the working poor; 
these groups are just as vulnerable as the fully unemployed. This article 
highlights a youth bulge as a critical national security indicator, and one 
where the proper international resources can have an impact far beyond 
their monetary value. As the United States reconsiders its military aid and 
assistance package to the Egyptian people, for example, youth unemploy-
ment should be at the top of policymakers' lists.
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Finally, some demographic trends, such as the youth bulge, can be benefi-
cial once a country reaches a certain point in demographic transition 
where birth and death rates begin to decline. Once this demographic pro-
gression begins, Dr. Urdal suggests that "countries may experience a win-
dow of opportunity for economic development, often called a 
'demographic dividend,' largely flowing from increased savings as the rel-
ative number of dependents decreases."40 In order to reach this stage in 
demographic transition, it will be necessary to keep the youth as 
employed and socially engaged as possible in order to reap the benefits 
and keep Egypt from falling into conflict.
Egypt is demographically on track to reap the benefits of a demographic 
dividend, as described above, and is approaching the zenith of its youth 
bulge. Recently, the trajectory of the population aged fifteen to twenty-
nine has begun to level off. However, note Ragui Assaad and Jayshree 
Bajoria of the Council on Foreign Relations, "that group of young people 
is making its way into the labor market right now and putting a lot of 
pressure in the form of unemployment and informalization of the labor 
market as they get poor jobs."41
The stage of a country's youth bulge along the demographic transition 
continuum is an important factor in determining when that country will 
experience demographic dividends, those being the societal benefits aris-
ing from the favorable change in the structure of the population. As stated 
above, a youth bulge can pay "demographic dividends" once the birth and 
death rates even out, resulting in a larger percentage of the population 
being economically productive in comparison to the amount that is 
dependent. Birth rates are also directly correlated to the level of education 
attained by women in society. For instance, the longer a girl stays in 
school, and the higher education level she attains, the fewer children she 
will have. Therefore, focusing on improvements in education for girls may 
shift Egypt and similarly situated countries in a positive direction in terms 
of getting to the next stage of the demographic transition. Moreover, 
increased access to health services, family planning, and sex education 
can contribute to demographic stability.42 While promising, these are 
especially challenging reforms in some of the more conservative Muslim 
societies due to the adherence by governments to outdated cultural 
norms. Health services also mitigate, and help prevent, the negative 
effects of HIV in developing countries, as HIV generally causes deaths in 
the middle-aged working population, contributing to a large youth bulge 
by changing, among other things, the proportional makeup of society.
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Conclusion
Security concerns resulting from, or exacerbated by, youth bulges and 
related demographic factors will not disappear any time soon. Approxi-
mately one-third of countries remain in the early stages of the demo-
graphic transition, increasing their likelihood of civil conflict well into the 
future.43 This phenomenon poses a challenge not only for the countries in 
which they occur, but throughout the international system. Many critics 
and experts are curious as to why the U.S. government and the U.S. intel-
ligence community failed to predict the recent events in the Arab world. 
Perhaps one reason is an underestimation of the power of demographics. 
Realizing the impact of these trends on other factors of stability, such as 
unemployment and poverty, is paramount for creating effective policies. 
Governments everywhere must address issues of age, or else deal with the 
consequences of ignoring them.
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